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COMMERCIAL LAW
Michael J. Herbert*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey of commercial law discusses all Supreme Court of
Virginia cases interpreting Virginia's version of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code") during the previous year, as well as
statutory changes made to the Code in the most recent session of
the General Assembly. It also reviews significant Code cases decided in the Virginia circuit courts and in the various federal
courts sitting in Virginia. It is current as of about May 1, 1989.
II. SALES

A. Foreclosing Secured Party's Remedies Against Seller!
Manufacturer
In Bryant v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.,' the Circuit Court of
the County of Henrico partially dealt with an issue that straddles
Article Two and Article Nine: what rights does a foreclosing secured party have against the seller or manufacturer of the collateral? In other words, does the secured party, upon foreclosure, acquire the rights that the buyer-debtor had against the seller or
manufacturer with regard to the goods upon which the secured
party foreclosed? In Bryant, the debtors purchased a Winnebago
camper, and financed the purchase through Chase Manhattan
Bank. The camper was seriously defective. The Bryants revoked
their acceptance of it and returned it to the seller. Chase repossessed the camper and sold it.2
The Bryants then sued Winnebago Industries, Inc. (the manufacturer), McGeorge Camping Center, Inc. (the seller), and Chase
for breach of warranty under the Code and for violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Chase cross-claimed against Winnebago and McGeorge. The Bryants settled their claims; thus, the
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., 1974,
John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan.
1. 15 Va. Cir. (1989).
2. Id. at _.
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only remaining dispute was between Chase and Winnebago/
McGeorge.3
The central issue was whether Chase, as a successor in interest
to the Bryants, acquired the warranty rights against Winnebago
and McGeorge. This issue was broken down into two sub-issues.
Unfortunately, only one was resolved by the court.
The first, unresolved, sub-issue was whether Chase benefitted
from the provisions of the so-called anti-privity statute, section
8.2-318. 4 That statute eliminates lack of privity as a defense "in
any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to
recover damages for breach of warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a
person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods. ' 'a Since Chase
was not in privity with Winnebago or McGeorge, it could not sue
for breach of warranty unless it, as a purchase money financier,
"might reasonably have been expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods." A decision that Chase satisfied this standard
would have sketched out an extraordinarily wide boundary for section 2-318; however, the court set the matter aside.
This was because the court held for Winnebago and McGeorge
on the second sub-issue: whether the remedies of a third party
beneficiary under section 2-318 are subject to contractual limitations. Under the contract with the Bryants, their exclusive remedies were repair or replacement of the camper. In addition, there
was a specific exclusion of consequential damages.' Chase could
not make use of the exclusive remedies because it had sold the
camper after the foreclosure. Chase attempted to argue its way out
of the limited remedies by asserting that the remedies had "failed
of [their] essential purpose" and were thus invalid under section
8.2-719(2).' The court rejected this for a very simple reason: one
remedy had already been used and it had worked. "The remedy
provided for in the warranty from Winnebago did not fail of its
essential purpose since the Bryants followed the remedy of revocation and returned the camper to McGeorge."' For the same reason,
3. Id. at _.
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Add. Vol. 1965).
5. Id.
6. Bryant, 15 Va. Cir. at -.
7. Id. at _; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-719(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
8. Bryant, 15 Va. Cir. at _.
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the court rejected Chase's Magnuson-Moss Claim."
The court was slightly off-center in its reasoning. The revocation
remedy was not a remedy provided for in the contract, which permitted only repair or replacement. 10 However, its view appears to
be essentially correct; it appears that McGeorge and Winnebago
ultimately provided the Bryants with an effective remedy (revocation) and Chase was attempting to broaden the remedy still
further.
What cannot be determined from the judge's opinion is the reason why Chase was still pursuing a claim against McGeorge and
Winnebago. If the settlement with the Bryants resulted in a full
refund of the purchase price (and this should have, if it indeed
resulted in a revocation of acceptance), then Chase should have
been made whole, or nearly so. The refund should certainly have
been treated as proceeds of the camper and thus subject to Chase's
security interest. 1 The refund, added to the proceeds of Chase's
sale of the camper, ought to have been enough to cover, or nearly
cover, the principal and interest on the loan. Therefore, it must be
assumed either that no refund was made, that the refund was of
less than the purchase price, that Chase failed to get its hands on
the refund, or that the debt was for some reason much greater
than would ordinarily be expected.
If either of the first two assumptions is correct, the opinion can
be seriously questioned. If the Bryants did not get back the full
purchase price in the settlement with Winnebago and McGeorge,
then it is arguable that there was no adequate remedy; the buyers
did not get the benefit of their bargain. In other words, the buyers
bargained for a functioning camper within a reasonable period of
time. If the seller/manufacturer could not provide that within the
scope of the exclusive, limited remedy (repair or replacement) then
that remedy failed of its essential purpose (which was to provide
the buyers with the benefit of their bargain) and some reasonably
equivalent Article Two remedy should then have become available
to them. Revocation of acceptance, coupled with refund of the
purchase price, would be such a remedy; it would give the Bryants
the reasonable equivalent of their bargain. If they got a full refund,
Chase should have had nothing to complain about. If they did not,
9. Id.
10. Id. at

11. See

-.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 8.9-306(1)-(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
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Chase should have won the case.
B. Scope of "Anti-Privity Statute"
Several other cases dealt with the scope of section 8.2-318. Two
federal cases reiterated the Fourth Circuit's earlier decision in Farish v. Courion Industries2 in which the court held that the elimination of privity as a defense does not apply to goods sold before
July 29, 1962, the effective date of former section 8.01-223 (predecessor of section 8.2-318). These cases, however, also held that,
even under the common law of Virginia, privity would not be a
defense in a negligence-based personal injury action.' 3 This latter
(and much more significant) holding should provide considerable
cheer to the plaintiffs' bar.
A Supreme Court of Virginia case, Hersel Corp. v. Canney, 4
could have been equally cheering.' 5 In Hersel, the court held that a
lessee of defective goods could sue the manufacturer and other
sellers of the goods for damages caused by breach of any warranties made by the manufacturer or other seller. In other words, section 8.2-318 gives a lessee the benefit of any warranties which the
lessor has been given or of which the lessor has the benefit. This
case opens up a significant new avenue of recovery for lessees of
goods who have suffered loss or injury because of defects in the
goods; it also parallels developments in lease law generally. Unfortunately for personal injury lawyers and their clients, the opinion
is unpublished.
III.

COMMERCIAL PAPER

Under section 8.3-401(1) of the Code, no person has any contractual liability on a negotiable instrument unless that person's signature appears on the instrument. x6 The signature, of course, can be
placed on the instrument either by the person or by the person's
12. 754 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1985). For a brief discussion of Farish,see Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH L. REV. 717, 730 (1985).

13. Derflinger v. Ford Motor Co., 866 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1989); Wilkes v. F.L. Smithe
Mach. Co., 704 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Va. 1989).
14. Hersel Corp. v. Canney, No. 870152 (Va. Apr. 21, 1989) (LEXIS, VA. library, cases
file).
15. See Fletcher, Lessee May Sue Products Maker under U.C.C. 3 VLW 1009, May 8,
1989.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-401(1) (Add. Vol. 1965).
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representative." The signature requirement was examined by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Curtis v. Lee Land Trust. 8 Curtis
and his spouse sold an option to buy certain land to a real estate
broker, Drucker & Falk. Drucker & Falk later transferred the option to Segaloff and Roos, who organized a land trust named Lee
Land Trust, to which they apparently transferred the option.
Segaloff and Roos were the beneficiaries of the land trust and
United Virginia Bank/Citizens & Marine was the trustee. 9
The option was exercised, and Curtis conveyed the property to
the trust for a partial cash payment, plus a promissory note and a
deed of trust, both of which were signed by the bank as trustee of
Lee Land Trust. The note went into default and the deed of trust
was foreclosed. Since the foreclosure sale resulted in a deficiency of
$183,018.42, suit was filed on the note against Lee Land Trust,
20
Segaloff and Roos.
The signatures on the note and the deed of trust were unambiguous. It was clear that the bank was signing as the trustee of Lee
Land Trust and there was no indication anywhere in the documents that the beneficiaries of the trust intended to be bound."
The plaintiff was able to point only to the lack of any language in
the documents which explicitly exculpated the beneficiaries. Of
course, the lack of exculpatory language was entirely irrelevant because the plaintiff could not establish that the bank's signature
had any power to bind the beneficiaries in. any event. In other
words, only if the bank was the agent of the beneficiaries could its
signature be construed as their signature; only in that situation
could the beneficiaries be contractually liable on the instrument.
Thus, only if such an agency relationship existed would there be
any need for a disclaimer of personal liability to shield the
beneficiaries.
The crucial question in the case, therefore, was whether the land
trust was an entity sufficiently distinct from its beneficiaries to
have liabilities independent of them. In other words, was the land
trust (as the plaintiff argued) merely a kind of informal partnership?2 2 If so, it would not be an entirely separate legal entity, and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 8.3-403(1).
235 Va. 491, 369 S.E.2d 853 (1988).
Id. at 492-93, 369 S.E.2d at 853.
Id. at 493, 369 S.E.2d at 853-54.
Id. at 495-98, 369 S.E.2d at 855-56.
Id. at 496, 369 S.E.2d at 855.
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its partners would ultimately be liable for its debts. Or was it a
"real" trust, an entity whose assets and obligations were separate
from those of its beneficiaries? Without much discussion, the court
decided that the land trust was a sufficiently distinct entity from
the beneficiaries to shield them from personal liability on its debts.
The court stated, "Initially, we reject summarily plaintiffs' contention that this land trust created under Code § 55-17.1 is not a trust
at all but some type of business organization such as a partnership.23 The court further stated, "Because of the nature of the land
trust, before personal liability can be imposed upon the benefi24
ciaries they must expressly or by implication promise to pay.
IV.
A.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Scope of Article Nine

Article Nine, by its terms, deals with security interests in personalty (and certain sales of intangible rights); it does not encompass interests in real property other than fixtures. 25 This, of course,
has created some difficulty in determining whether borderline collateral which involves both realty and personalty is subject to Article Nine. In a decision which reversed a case discussed in last
year's survey,26 the Fourth Circuit held that a buyer's rights under
a real estate contract are real property rights, not personal property rights, and thus not subject to Article Nine.21 The debtor,
Wilson, had exercised an option to purchase realty. After the exercise of the option, Wilson granted Dominion Bank a security interest in all his "accounts receivable . . . and contract rights. ' 28 Because of the doctrine of equitable conversion, Wilson's interest in
the contract after the exercise of the option was treated by the
court as real property; it was thus not subject to the security
29
interest.
23. Id. at 496, 369 S.E.2d at 855.
24. Id. at 498, 369 S.E.2d at 857.
25.

VA. CODE. ANN.

§§ 8.9-102(1), 9-104(j) (Add. Vol. 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1989).

26. See discussion of In re Wilson, 86 Bankr. 871 (W.D. Va. 1988) in Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 499, 515 (1988).
27. Dominion Bank v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1989).
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 206.
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B.

Requirements of Attachment

1.

Change of Debtor's Entity Status

In In re Q.T., Inc.,3 0 a case which may have a major impact on
lending practices, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, Richmond Division, explored the degree to which a security agreement survives a change in the entity status of the debtor.
This case significantly, and perhaps critically, limits the degree to
which a secured party will have rights in property acquired by the
new entity. In In re Q.T., Inc., P.D.Q. Corporation ("P.D.Q.") sold
certain assets of its tractor-trailer repair business to Richard Bain.
Bain in turn granted P.D.Q a security interest to secure the payment of $130,000 of the purchase price. The collateral included,
among other things, "accounts hereafter arising." Bain transferred
the purchased assets to his wholly-owned corporation, Q.T., Inc.
("Q.T.") which actually operated the business. Q.T. was included
on the financing statements but did not sign the security agreement. Thomas Russell & Company succeeded to the rights of
P.D.Q. Q.T. subsequently went bankrupt, and, in the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings, challenged the validity of Thomas Russell's claim to its accounts receivable. 3 1
The key question before the court was whether it should limit
the apparent scope of section 8.9-203(1), which requires, for the
attachment of a security interest in accounts receivable that:
(a) the ... debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a
description of the collateral ... ; and
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral."
Q.T. did not sign the security agreement. Thus, the security interest could not attach to property acquired by it from someone other
than Bain 3 3 unless the court found some exception to the signature
requirement.
Several out-of-state cases have dealt with this problem. Gener30. 99 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)
31. Id. at 311.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-203(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
33. Property subject to the security interest granted by Bain would remain subject to that
security interest even though it was transferred to Q.T. See id. § 9-306(2). Thus, any accounts that Bain had transferred to Q.T. would have been subject to Thomas Russell's security interest; but there apparently were no such accounts.

530
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ally, when the debtor has merely changed its entity structure, and
not the actual ownership and control of the business, the courts
have found some way to enforce the security agreement even
though it was not signed by the new entity. In other words, when a
proprietor or partnership incorporates, and the proprietor or partners become the sole owners and managers of the new corporation,
the courts are likely to hold that the security agreement binds the
corporation. For example, in In re Pubs, Inc. of Champaign," an
informal partnership which had granted a security interest subsequently incorporated. The court held the corporate entity was estopped from raising the fact that it had not signed the security
agreement.35 The court in In re West Coast Food Sales, Inc 6 did
not even bother with an estoppel; it held outright that the conversion of a proprietorship into a corporation primarily owned and
controlled by the former proprietor did not destroy the effectiveness of a security agreement previously executed by the
proprietor. 7
The out-of-state precedents were rejected by the court in In re
Q.T., Inc., which found them inapplicable because, at the time of
the transaction, the secured party apparently knew that Bain was
about to transfer the collateral to Q.T.:
In contrast to West Coast and its companions, in this case the secured party knew a transfer of its debtor's assets to another party
was to take place, and by the very language of its security agreement
contemplated such a transfer ....
In these circumstances, the
Court concludes that Thomas Russell had the responsibility to protect itself. Because Thomas Russell was aware of the prospect of immediate disposition of its collateral, it could have required as a condition of the sale to Bain that Bain's transferee execute a security
agreement.3 8
It is certainly true that Thomas Russell could easily have protected itself; it is equally true that the decision fits within the
"plain meaning" of the statutory provision. What is less clear is
why, under the facts of In re Q.T., Inc., Thomas Russell should
have suffered the loss it did. There is no indication that any other
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

618 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 438.
637 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 709.
In re Q.T. Inc., 99 Bankr. 310, 312-13 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
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creditor was misled by or injured by the failure to get Q.T.'s signature on the security agreement; indeed, given the fact that Q.T.
was listed on the financing statement, it is exceedingly unlikely
that any creditor could have been misled. Nor is there any doubt
about the fact that the parties intended Q.T. to be bound. The
only beneficiaries of the decision were the general unsecured creditors (who received a windfall, unanticipated and unearned).
The In re Q.T., Inc. decision will be of relatively little significance if it is confined to situations in which the secured creditor
knew before the execution of the security interest that the debtor
was going to make an immediate change of its entity status. If it is
read more broadly, it will create a serious problem for secured
creditors. If, for example, a change of entity status to which a creditor has no notice will preclude the creditor's claim to after acquired property, In re Q.T., Inc. will impose a significant monitoring burden on secured creditors.
Finally, at the time this article is going to press, In re Q.T. is on
appeal. There is some reason to believe it will be reversed.
2.

Miscellaneous Attachment Requirements

Grossmann v. Saunders39 dealt with two of the basic requirements for attachment of a possessory security interest: the secured
party must have possession of the collateral pursuant to agreement
and the debtor must have rights in the collateral.40 In Grossmann,
the plaintiff, Grossmann, had been in business with Saunders.
When their partnership was dissolved, Grossmann transferred his
interest to Saunders in exchange for Saunders promise to "set
aside" certain promissory notes payable to Saunders (the "Grossmann notes"). The principal and interest collected from the notes
was to be paid to Grossmann as received by Saunders. Saunders
remained in possession of the Grossmann notes. Saunders subsequently transferred the former partnership assets (including the
Grossmann notes) to his corporation, American Vacation Resorts,
Inc. ("AVR"). The court held that AVR effectively assumed Saunders obligations to Grossmann.4 '
AVR and/or Saunders subsequently transferred the Grossmann
39. 237 Va. 113, 376 S.E.2d 66 (1989).
40. VA. Coin: ANN. § 8.9-203 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
41. Id. at 119, 376 S.E.2d at 69.

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:523

notes to Bank of Virginia (the "Bank") and Community Federal
Savings and Loan Association ("Community Federal")."' Thus, the
crucial question was whether the Bank and Community Federal
had a security interest in the notes which had priority over Grossmann's interest in them.
The first issue was whether the putative secured parties were in
possession of the notes "pursuant to agreement;" that is, whether
the notes had been placed in their possession as part of a security
agreement with AVR/Saunders. Since the case went to the Supreme Court of Virginia on a demurrer to Grossmann's motion for
judgement, the only accessible information the court had on this
issue were Grossmann's allegations that AVR/Saunders "gave" or
"transferred" the notes to the Bank and Community Federal. In
the court's view, this was insufficient. The case was remanded for
an evidentiary hearing in which the Bank and Community Federal
were "required to establish that Saunders provided the Bank and
Community Federal with a security interest in the notes for the
4' 3
purpose of securing an obligation he has to each party.
The second issue was whether Saunders had sufficient "rights in
the collateral" for a security interest to attach. It is well established that a debtor need not have title to collateral to grant a
security interest in it. Any cognizable property right is sufficient.
Under the Grossmann/Saunders agreement, Saunders retained a
minor interest in the notes. Specifically, the second paragraph of
clause two of the agreement provided that:
During the first two years from the designation and setting aside of
the notes as aforesaid, [Saunders] covenants that upon default in
the payment of any of the notes by the maker thereof, [Saunders]
will cause a replacement note or notes of equal value to be set aside
for the benefit of [Grossmann]."
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court did not
have to and did not deal with the further question of what rights
Saunders had. Although it is certainly true that a debtor can grant
a security interest in a limited property right, the rights of the secured party to the property in question cannot be broader than the
42. Id. at 118, 376 S.E.2d at 69.
43. Id. at 122, 376 S.E.2d at 71.
44. Id. at 117, 376 S.E.2d at 68.
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rights of the debtor.45 Saunders' interest rights in the notes appears to have been a form of reversionary interest; if the maker of
any note failed to pay, Saunders would replace the defaulted note
with a new note from another maker. He would then "own" and be
able to collect on the defaulted note. If so, the rights of the Bank
and Community Federal would be no greater; they too would have
the right to substitute other notes and collect on defaulted notes.
Obviously, those rights would be of little value to them."
The case would be clearer in this regard if the court had explicitly characterized the Grossmann-Saunders agreement regarding
the notes as a security agreement. The rights of Grossmann clearly
met the Code's sweeping definition of a security interest;47 and the
court, elsewhere in the opinion, implicitly dealt with their arrangement as an Article Nine transaction. 48 Under this approach, Saunders would be the "owner" of the notes, subject to the security interest of Grossmann; that security interest was unperfected and
thus subject to the perfected security interest of the Bank and
Community Federal. 9 Perhaps the court dodged this issue because
the case came up on demurrer and the facts were undeveloped.
C. Perfection and Priorities
1. Collateral Description
While the attachment of a security interest establishes the rights
of the immediate parties to the transaction, the debtor and the secured party, perfection is usually required to establish the secured
party's priority vis-a-vis other parties who have claims to or
against the collateral. Except for certain consumer goods transactions, perfection usually requires that the secured party do a
"perfecting act" which will give notice to the world of its interest
in the collateral. The most common perfecting acts are the secured
party taking possession, the filing of a financing statement or state45. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-6, at 987-88 (3d ed.
1988).
46. Of course, if either the Bank or Community Federal had qualified as a holder in due
course, their rights would, under Article Three, be greater than those of their transferor;
they would take free of Grossmann's claim. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-305(1) (Add. Vol.
1965). However, the parties agreed that the notes were non-negotiable, thus not subject to
Article Three. See 237 Va. at 123, 376 S.E.2d at 72.
47. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-201(37) (Add. Vol 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
48. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
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ments covering the goods, or the notation on a certificate of title.
As a general rule, perfection protects the secured party against
other interests that arise subsequent to the perfecting act. There
are several new Virginia cases dealing with various perfection and
priority issues.
One of the issues debated in early Article Nine case law was the
degree of specificity required in the financing statement. The
drafters of the Code opted for so-called notice filing; the financing
statement does not need a detailed description of collateral, but
does need "a statement indicating the type, or describing the
items, of collateral."5 0 Over the years it has become well-established in other states that, insofar as business loans are concerned,
very broad descriptions (such as "all equipment," "all inventory"
and the like) are sufficient, provided that the "types" of collateral
are approximately as specific as the categories of collateral set out
in Article Nine itself. Federal court cases interpreting Virginia law
have assumed this to be true in the Commonwealth as well.5 In
Hixon v. Credit Alliance Corp.,5 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia
confirmed this assumption. It held specifically that "[a] financing
statement which describes collateral only as, '"machinery and
equipment"' provides 'a sufficient description and [is] a valid financing statement.' -53
The court also held that the use of a list of specific items of
collateral as part of the financing statement did not limit the
perfection to those items specifically listed. The actual financing
statement consisted of several documents, including a copy of the
security agreement. Paragraph eight of the cover document described the collateral as:
All machinery, inventory, equipment and goods as described in attached entire Agreement &/or in any Schedule prepared in connection therewith. This UCC form together with the attached Security
Agreement &/or Schedule are being submitted for filing herewith as
a financing statement. 4
The attached security agreement referred, in a pre-printed provi50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-402(1) (Add. Vol. 1965 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
51. See, e.g., In re Tebbs Constr. Co., 39 Bankr. 742, 746 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984).
52. 235 Va. 466, 369 S.E.2d 169 (1988).
53. 235 Va. at 470, 369 S.E.2d at 172 (quoting In re Tebbs Constr. Co., 39 Bankr. 742, 746
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)).
54. Id. at 468-69, 369 S.E.2d at 171.
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sion, to "the goods, chattels and property described in the annexed
Schedule A and all other . . . machinery [and] equipment . . .
now or hereafter belonging to the Mortgagor . . . . ,,55 The court
correctly held that, given the "mere notice" function of the Article
Nine financing statement, the perfection was not limited to the
Schedule A items. The question, of course, is one of allocating a
burden; do we require the secured party to file an unambiguous
financing statement or do we place on subsequent claimants the
burden of investigating ambiguities? The Code clearly opts for the
latter: "The notice itself indicates merely that the secured party
who has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs." 6 Thus, in the court's
view:
We do not think a reasonably diligent title searcher would limit his
examination to Schedule A. Instead, we think he would read Paragraph 8 of the financing statement and realize that the security
agreement is made part of the financing statement and that the two
must be read together to determine what is included in collateral.5"

2.

Misfiled Financing Statement

To perfect a security interest by financing statement, the financing statement or statements must be filed in the right location.
There is, however, a slight mitigation of this rule. Under section
8.9-401(2), if a subsequent claimant has actual knowledge of the
contents of a financing statement which was filed incorrectly but in
good faith, the financing statement will be effective as to that
claimant.5 8 A recent Fourth Circuit opinion, Zieg v. United
States59 examined a further question of whether this savings provision applies to proceeds of the original collateral?
Kermit Zieg loaned Jeanne Davis, Michael Davis and Davis
Properties ("Davis") $50,000, secured in part by certain contract
rights owned by Davis. The financing statement was incorrectly
filed. Later, Davis sold some of its contract rights to a person iden55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 470, 369 S.E.2d at 172 (emphasis and omission in original).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-402 comment 2 (Add. Vol. 1965) (emphasis added).
235 Va. at 470, 369 S.E.2d at 171.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-401(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
849 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1988).
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tified as Eden in exchange for chattel paper.6 0 The competing creditor, the Small Business Administration, had actual knowledge of
the contents of the financing statement. The court held this was
sufficient to protect Zieg's interest in the contract rights but not
his interest in the proceeds of those contract rights, the chattel
paper.
The question is a close one and appears to have been one of first
impression. The rationale of section 8.9-401(2) is of course that a
subsequent claimant who in fact knew of the transaction between
the debtor and the secured party has no reason to complain about
the mere fact that the financing statement was in the wrong place.
The Zieg court's rationale seems to be that this is intended as an
extremely limited exception to the general Article Nine filing rules,
which are otherwise a pure "race to the filing office" statute, and
that it should therefore be limited to its narrowest possible
reading:
Zieg asks this court to excuse his good faith error on the first filing,
which we are willing to do as per § 8.9-401(2). Then he asks us to
forgive his failure to file as to the chattel paper because if his first
misfiling is given legal effect no second filing need occur, § 8.9-306(3)
(footnote omitted). We are simply not willing to take this step, for
that would mean that one who incorrectly filed a [financing statement] as to the original collateral and never made any attempt to
file as to the proceeds of that collateral could maintain first priority.
One who so thoroughly sleeps oi his rights is not entitled to so
much protection. 1
This statement, however, is long on rhetoric and short on reasoning. As the court acknowledges, if Zieg had originally filed correctly, the financing statement would have perfected not only the
security interest in the original collateral but in the chattel paper
proceeds as well.6 2 Thus, if we assume that Zieg reasonably believed that the first filing was adequate, he would have had no reason to make a second filing on the proceeds. He was not "sleeping
on his rights"; he in good faith believed that his rights were already protected and had no reason to expect that any further act
was required. Thus, it is the author's view that the Zieg case is,
60. Id. at 899.
61. Id. at 900-01.
62. Id. at 900.
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from a policy standpoint, incorrect. However, it can be justified by
noting that the Code nowhere states or even suggests that the savings provision should extend to proceeds.
3.

First to File or Perfect Rule

Priorities under Article Nine are usually based on "first in time,
first in right." With regard to conflicting security interests, priority
is generally based on the date of perfection or the date on which a
financing statement is filed. The secured party who was either the
first to file or the first to perfect usually gets the collateral."' This
rule was examined in Grossmann v. Saunders,64 discussed above. 5
Grossmann had what appeared to be an unperfected security interest in certain non-negotiable promissory notes payable to Saunders
and/or Saunders' company. Two rival creditors had what were alleged to be perfected security interests in the same notes.
Grossmann argued that the perfected security interests should
not have priority over his interest because (he claimed) the other
secured parties had "actual notice" of his interest.6 6 The court
properly rejected this argument. However, it left a cryptic loophole
which it labeled "good faith":
Although lack of notice is not a prerequisite to the operation of
Code § 8.9-312(5), Code § 8.1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or
duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Accordingly, allegations and proof of "a
leading on, bad faith or inequitable conduct" on the part of a secured party may affect the priorities established under Code § 8.9312(5) by estopping the assertion of a priority. '6
In one sense, this statement is clearly accurate; any deliberate
misleading of another secured party could be the basis for modifying the ordinary priority rules. However, two caveats apply. First,
this is not a question of "good faith" under the Code; the Code's
good faith requirement applies only to contracts and duties under
the Code. With rare exception, there is no contract between two
secured parties who merely happen to have claims to the same col63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

§ 8.9-312(5) (Add. Vol 1965).
237 Va. 113, 376 S.E.2d 66 (1989).
See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
Id. at 124, 371 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 124-25, S.E.2d at 72.
VA. CODE ANN.
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lateral. Nor, with regard to the establishment of priorities, does the
Code impose any duties between secured parties.
Second, any court-imposed reworking of priority rules should be
limited to the most egregious cases. For example, if one secured
party fraudulently induces another secured party to lend money
based on deliberate misstatements concerning the defrauding secured party's collateral position, an estoppel may be justified.
Under no circumstances, rather than those explicitly provided for
in Article Nine, should mere notice or even actual knowledge of an
unperfected security interest prevent a secured party from obtaining a security interest that will have priority over the unperfected security interest. As noted, the drafters of Article Nine
intended it to be a virtually pure "race to the filing office" statute;
with extremely rare exceptions, the only question should be which
secured party was the first to file or perfect. For these reasons, the
"good faith" discussion in Grossmann should be given an extremely narrow interpretation by the courts.
4.

Effect of Failure to Give Notice of Sale

Part five of Article Nine contains a number of provisions regulating the rights and obligations of the debtor and secured party in
the event of the debtor's default. Section 8.9-504 sets out the requirements for the sale of collateral by the secured party; among
them is a requirement that in most cases, the debtor must be given
prior notice of the sale.6 8 Failure to comply with the requirement,
or indeed with any requirements of Part five, can subject the secured party to liability for any losses suffered by the debtor; in a
consumer transaction, losses are presumed. 9
One question that has vexed the courts for many years is
whether the statutory sanctions are exclusive. This generally arises
in the context of an action by the secured party for a deficiency
judgement. In other words, if the sale does not raise enough money
to pay off the debt, and the secured party sues the debtor for the
balance, can the debtor successfully defend against the suit merely
by showing that the secured party violated Part five, or does the
debtor have to show actual damages as a result of the violation?
This question is especially important if the violation is a failure to
give proper notice, because the debtor will rarely be able to show
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-504(3) (Add. Vol. 1965).
69. Id. § 9-507.
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that the lack of notice caused any actual damages to it.
The case law is in hopeless disarray; cases can be found supporting three basic positions: first, a violation of Part five never automatically precludes a deficiency judgement; second, a violation always automatically precludes a deficiency judgement; third, a
violation creates a rebuttable presumption that the goods, when
sold, were worth the amount of the debt. 70 The third approach has
the effect of presuming that the damages suffered by the debtor
are equal to the amount of the deficiency, which in turn requires
the secured party to demonstrate that the price received was the
fair market value as a precondition of recovering the deficiency.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to rule on the issue; however, the Fourth Circuit has opined that if it did, it would adopt
the rebuttable presumption rule. 7 ' One Virginia circuit court case
now agrees with the Fourth Circuit, adopting the rebuttable presumption rule.72
D. Miscellaneous Cases
Two miscellaneous circuit court cases should be noted; while
neither breaks new legal ground, each contains a good discussion of
some Article Nine basics. The first is C. W. Jackson Hauling, Inc.
v. Southern Eagle,73 a recent case which provides a fine primer on
the basic rules regarding accounts financing and priorities. The
second is an older, but recently reported case, Cho v. Lee,74 which
includes a lengthy and thoughtful discussion of the elements of a
"commercially reasonable" foreclosure sale.

70. For an extensive discussion of the cases in various states, see J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 45, at § 25-19 pp. 1245-53.
71. In re Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973).
72. First Va. Bank v. Richardson, 13 Va. Cir. 198 (1988).
73. 12 Va. Cir. 401 (1988).
74. 13 Va. Cir. 520 (1982).

